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1. Introduction 
Household debt is on the rise in terms of numbers of households that have outstanding liabilities, of 
numbers of credit instruments available and used, and in terms of the total debt owed (both in levels, 
and relative to income). Table 1, which is based on national accounts data that are only available for a 
few countries, suggests that while the bulk of credit to households is extended in the form of 
mortgages, unsecured credit has seen some of the most spectacular growth rates.  
Growing interest by researchers and policymakers mirrors such empirical patterns. Macroeconomic 
influences on the phenomenon are fairly clear. Kent, Ossolinski and Willard (2007), for instance, 
examine national accounts data seeking to explain the dynamics of aggregate household debt holding 
across countries, finding that a general trend towards lower inflation and lower real interest rates, 
possibly coupled with such demographic factors as population ageing, can account for some of the 
wide observed variation. That and other recent studies also explore the macroeconomic policy 
implications of changes in macroeconomic and financial market conditions (easing of credit 
constraints, lower unemployment risk, etc), highlighting risks entailed by higher exposure of 
households to adverse shocks in the future. Household balance-sheets’ vulnerability is increased by 
high debt levels, all the more so if increasing indebtedness is rooted in unduly optimistic expectations 
based on favourable conditions of the recent past. Improving researchers’ and policymakers’ 
understanding of changes in household debt holding is all the more important as the Summer 2007 
financial turmoil actually may indicate market participants’ limited ability to gauge correctly 
households’ borrowing capacity and repayment ability, even in the United States and other Anglo-
Saxon countries where high and increasing levels of household debt have been observed for at least a 
couple of decades.  
Controlling for microeconomic structural factors and for heterogeneity in both preferences and 
constraints, however, is especially important both for the purpose of assessing welfare implications, 
and for that of ensuring comparability of aggregate data across counties. Household indebtedness is a 
more recent and very fast-growing phenomenon in other industrialized countries. Internationally 
comparative empirical research on the topic would potentially be very fruitful, but is very much less 
developed than on policy-relevant aspects of country-specific institutions and outcomes in other fields 
of macroeconomics. Only a very limited amount of such comparative work has been done in the 
literature. The volume by Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002) offers detailed country-specific 
empirical studies of household portfolios, but pays only limited attention to their liability side. The 
volume by Bertola, Disney and Grant (2006) focuses specifically on consumer credit demand and 
supply, but the cross-country empirical evidence reported and discussed by Crook (2006) and Jentzsch 
and Riesta (2006) is admittedly scant and imprecisely measured. More than in other fields, empirical  
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research on consumer credit and household debt issues is hampered by the availability of suitably 
comparable data.  
In this paper, we discuss the conceptual and practical issues underlying this unfortunate situation. The 
academic literature has adopted a variety of approaches to exploiting administrative sources and 
household survey data. In order to understand and appreciate the literature’s research directions, it is 
useful to outline – as we do in this paper – the relationship between available data definitions and 
sources, and the type of data economists working on household debt issues may ideally want to be able 
to access in order to study fruitfully institutional and market mechanisms that bear on welfare- and 
policy-relevant aspects of microeconomic and macroeconomic interactions.  
To assess the usefulness of defining and measuring various characteristics of credit instruments, it is 
important to understand how they bear on economic behaviour. On the demand side, the 
microeconomic relevance of consumer debt is theoretically obvious in light of the fact that household 
credit can provide substantial welfare gains, as it enables consumption possibilities that are not 
available otherwise. Households use credit to finance purchases of durable consumer goods and 
houses, and they use it to bridge temporary drops in income, for instance over the business cycle. For 
different purposes, different types of credit with varying characteristics have become available and 
households use them to address specific needs. Next to mortgages and other forms of collateralised 
credit, unsecured forms of debt such as credit card balances and checking account overdrafts are 
among the standard debt instruments in reach for individual households. Other types of credit type 
instruments have been developed that are partly linked to particular assets or insurances.  
On the supply side, increasingly sophisticated credit scoring methods and financial engineering of new 
and sometimes fairly opaque securities has vastly increased credit availability, especially in the recent 
phase of globally high liquidity and extremely low interest rates in may industrialized countries. 
Increasing sophistication and disintermediation, however, may in some cases result in more poorly 
informed household decisions, as understanding credit instrument characteristics becomes more 
important while information does not necessarily become more accessible to households. From the 
macroeconomic point of view, easier access to debt instruments by households can be stabilizing if the 
absence of liquidity constraints allows aggregate consumption to smooth out the aggregate demand 
implications of productivity shocks and other sources of cyclical fluctuations. But it can also be 
destabilizing if financial liberalization leads to more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the financial 
sector of the economy, as access to more or less plentiful debt can act as a multiplier of poorly 
informed or less than fully rational expectation changes. Whether indebtedness has stabilizing or 
destabilizing influences on average is empirically unclear, as examples of both can be found in the few 
countries with a sufficiently long history of formal consumer debt development. And it certainly  
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depends in theory on details of debt instruments, such the extent of collateralization, liquidity, and 
maturity, that are poorly measured in available data.  
Policy issues are also clearly apparent in that there is a substantial heterogeneity across countries as 
regards the type of credit instruments available to typical households. As financial markets become 
more and more integrated—especially among the member countries of the Euro zone—credit 
instruments developed in one country may also become available in others. This, however, crucially 
depends on country-specific government regulation and cross-border restrictions, as well as 
international harmonization of tax systems and labour markets. Institutional idiosyncrasies do 
contribute largely to explaining the cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of availability, design and 
use of different credit types. Thus, caution should be exercised in designing internationally 
comparable databases on household asset and debt holdings. It is particularly important to take into 
account incentives provided by institutions, such as the tax system, when assessing the credit portfolio 
of households, devising appropriately different questionnaires across countries.  
2. Economic Aspects: Aims of research on household debt data 
In this first section, we sketch some of the implications of economic theory’s approach to credit for 
data requirements. We proceed in the next section to classify credit instruments in terms of relevant 
characteristics, before describing the main components of household debt portfolios found in real data. 
Lastly, we discuss measurement issues for different (administrative vs. survey) data sources, and we 
identify particularly valuable types of information. A short conclusion summarizes our main points. 
2.1 Consumption, Liabilities, Assets 
The demand for credit, however defined, is ultimately derived from the underlying plan for 
consumption and its deviation from incomes and expenditures. From the life-cycle point of view, 
equalization of discounted marginal utilities of consumption over time implies positive demand for 
credit at times when current income and liquid assets (accumulated by past savings) fall short of 
consumption wishes. This also includes situations where expenditure and consumption are not 
simultaneous, such as in the case of durable goods purchases. In general, demand for credit depends 
on characteristics of the income path (in particular, timing, volatility and growth), and of the attitudes 
of consumers towards risk and time. Just like savings can be spent later, debt entails repayment, hence 
interactions between time preference and income growth are of course similar as regards household 
liabilities and household assets.  
As we will discuss in more detail below, however, different debt and asset vehicles are likely to differ 
qualitatively in several key respects. Some household assets, notably stocks, are subject to nominal 
capital gains or losses; many household assets (such as housing and other durables) provide direct 
consumption services, and some may serve as conspicuous signals to peers and neighbours. Debt may  
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not be comfortable for households (and stigma may arise from bankruptcy). And it is typically fixed in 
nominal terms (at least the principal, perhaps not the interest). The same is true of some household 
assets, but nominal bond holdings are more liquid than debt, which rarely has a market value at the 
level of the individual household: while assets can be accumulated by means of depressing 
consumption, incurring debt requires finding a lender who is willing to lend at conditions acceptable to 
the borrower. Supply restrictions lead to liquidity constraints, also in terms of interest rate differentials 
between positive and negative (short sales) balances on the same underlying portfolio item.
1 In 
general, the menu of debt instruments is likely to be more severely constrained than the menu of 
assets: in other words, borrowing constraints are more prevalent than “lending constraints” resulting 
from limited access to assets. Hence, a consumer’s intertemporal optimality conditions are violated in 
a specific direction, with important implications for behaviour not only at times when constraints are 
binding but also in anticipation of possibly binding constraints in the future. Such asymmetries 
accompany consumers throughout their life—at the end of which assets, but not debt (if greater than 
assets), can be passed on to future generations. 
2.2 The Household Debt Portfolio 
Keeping in mind such realistic distinctions, however, in order to appreciate issues arising when 
defining and measuring various types of assets and liabilities, it may be helpful to first picture a 
situation where all kinds of uncertainties, indivisibilities, tax distortions, transactions costs, liquidity 
constraints, short sales constraints, information asymmetries and other conceivable frictions and 
imperfections are absent. In such a world, each asset would yield the same return, and each asset’s 
value would correspond to the net present value of its annuity service flow. In the extreme, there 
would not even be need to distinguish owning from renting, to distinguish mortgages from bank 
account overdrafts, to tell credit cards from jewelry, savings from borrowing, as each of them could be 
costlessly and instantly converted from one form to another and from there to consumption. In the 
absence of financial market imperfections, what counts is net worth (including human capital) as a 
function of age of the individual investor, and portfolio choices are analytically separable from 
consumption decisions. 
In reality, of course, it is just because financial markets are imperfect that various forms of assets are 
conceptually distinct from various forms of liabilities. At a second, institutional level, one will also 
observe substantial differences between various countries, or possibly within countries, as tax laws, 
designs and market structures of financial markets, and the actual workings of the economy and its 
political-judicial frame provide different incentives for the individual consumer-investor household to 
structure their asset and debt portfolios. Relevant interactions between interest rate, credit constraints, 
                                                 
1 Relevant theoretical papers are Artle and Varaya (1978), Mariger (1987), and Deaton (1991), early empirical 
studies include Zeldes (1989) or Runkle (1991)  
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housing and durable goods, and adjustment costs cannot be surveyed here, and are very complex (see 
Bertola, Disney, Grant, 2006).  
Juster and Shay (1964) noted that interest rates are different on consumers' assets, liabilities, and 
durable purchases. They characterized qualitatively the implications of this state of affairs for 
consumer choices, and explored survey data empirically, focusing in particular on the sensitivity of 
aggregate consumption to changes in macroeconomic monetary conditions. While the extensive 
literature analysing consumers’ constrained borrowing mostly did not follow up on these early efforts, 
focusing on simple quantity constraints instead, there are a few notable exceptions: Attanasio (1995) 
stresses the importance of cash outlays for liquidity constrained consumers, who are prepared to pay 
higher interest rates in exchange for longer loan duration; and Brugiavini and Weber (1994) and 
Alessie, Devereux, and Weber (1997) also analyse empirical relationships between borrowing 
opportunities and durable-good purchases. These and other contributions propose and study models 
where borrowing opportunities depend on the existing stock of durable goods. Bertola, Guiso and 
Pistaferri (2005) focus on the role of uncertainty in shaping durable and nondurable expenditure 
patterns and in their data, credit restrictions do not appear to be binding. 
To characterize how data may be useful for research, it is important to keep in mind the final goals of 
scientific work on the relevant issues. Portfolio behaviour depends on tastes and environment, and 
researchers and policy makers are interested in disentangling the two; characterizing tastes makes it 
possible to evaluate welfare, and disentangling the effects of various environmental features opens the 
way to intervention meant to alter them. Gollier (2002) offers a thorough, analytically tractable 
characterization of optimal household portfolio behaviour (see also Haliassos and Michaelides, 2002, 
for numerical methods and results).  Like all individual choices, the amount and composition of a 
household’s assets depend on “tastes and technology”—on the objective, and on the constraints, of the 
relevant maximization problem. In the specific case of a household saving/borrowing and portfolio 
behaviour, it is useful to characterize the object of maximization in terms of the curvature of the utility 
function and of its derivatives, and in terms of the length of the planning horizon. Very relevant and 
well-explored aspects of a household’s constrained possibilities set pertain to the volatility, 
correlation, and mean-reversion characteristics of labour income streams and asset returns. Many of 
the issues on which research on household liabilities must focus, however, pertain to the list ‘other 
factors’ briefly discussed in Gollier’s Section 1.6 (liquidity constraints, transaction costs, taxation) and 
to other elements of market incompleteness and imperfection. 
A meaningful distinction can be drawn between (for example) the financial circumstances of a 
household that owns a large house and owes large mortgage debt, and those of a household holding a 
less valuable house and a similarly smaller mortgage: and such a distinction in terms of circumstances 
is meaningful because each of the situations can be determined by the history of asset returns and past  
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household choices, and by the difficulty of switching between those and other portfolio configurations, 
rather than by heterogeneous household tastes.  
In order to organize data amenable to international comparison, documenting the latter factors (and 
taking tastes as given) is likely to be very productive, and certainly more policy-relevant than a 
characterization of how behaviour may depend on detailed characteristics of utility functions. There 
exists interesting comparative work on the role of ‘tastes’, as accounted for by ethnic origin and other 
background characteristics: Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994, 1999) examine the saving and borrowing 
behaviour of immigrants from different countries of origin in country-specific surveys, finding that 
behaviour does not seem to be significantly affected by ethnic and cultural origin or, to the extent that 
statistically significant effects can be detected, that the pattern of ‘origin’ dummies does not conform 
to country-of-origin aggregate savings patterns. 
Aggregate and individual saving and borrowing patterns depend not only on cultural characteristics, 
but also on institutional and market characteristics. Documenting a large variety of aspects of 
household behaviour, and a similarly large variety of environmental features determining its 
constrained optimality, can allow researchers to estimate subtle effects and obtain valuable insights 
into welfare determination and policy choices. Within each country, policy variation can be used to 
obtain insights of hopefully general relevance about human objectives and interactions. The much 
larger variability of circumstances across countries can potentially, if appropriately documented and 
with suitable controls for other heterogeneity, yield stronger and more easily generalisable insights. 
As changes in underlying frictions and institutions changes behaviour at the micro level, there are 
possibly important feedbacks at the macro level through changes in relative prices of the various asset 
and debt categories. While we abstract in our discussion from effects on prices, public finances, or 
general equilibrium, it is important to bear such effects in mind when making international 
comparisons involving several countries. For our purposes we consider it more important to have a 
closer look at the relevant characteristics of the various liabilities. 
3. Characteristics of debt instruments 
In some respects, portfolio considerations of households are similar to those of firms, banks, and the 
government. The pattern of cash outlays has different maturity across different assets and liabilities. 
And just like the portfolios of banks and other corporations, the portfolios of households are 
leveraged: it is sensible for households to simultaneously hold assets and liabilities as long as their 
maturities and rates of return are different (for intrinsic or tax reasons) in advantageous ways.  
However, it has to be borne in mind that the portfolio of a typical household is peculiar in several 
ways. Most strikingly, household financial portfolios are not very diversified. The most important non-
financial asset, human capital, is not marketed. Household assets pay dividends in terms of utility  
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when they take the form of durable goods in use (includes housing). Less obviously, the portfolio of a 
household also pays dividends in terms of utility when trading in assets and liabilities makes it 
possible to stabilize nondurable consumption in the face of income fluctuations. And the leverage 
characteristics of household portfolios are not as easily explained as those of financial institutions’ 
portfolios. ‘Oddities’ in financial behaviour have been observed and documented, and occasionally 
been attributed to not fully rational expectation formation (Ausubel, 1991). 
Among the characteristics of standard household debt instruments, the following may be worth 
singling out and discussing: 
i.  Availability: rationing is widespread, sometimes to zero, sometimes to a specific amount 
as in the case of credit card limits and of bank account lines of credit. Specific aspects of less 
than complete availability pertain to 
a)  Access (transaction) costs, such as cadastral registration and notary fees for 
mortgages, administration fees for instalment credit and annual fees for credit cards. 
Convenience costs may also be subsumed under transactions costs—they are the opportunity 
cost of having to apply for new credit with every credit-financed purchase to be made. Such 
costs are particularly low for revolving credit, even more so when fungibility is high (as is the 
case with credit cards issued on universal networks). Documenting such aspects empirically, 
and accounting for them theoretically, can explain the prevalence of zeros in specific debt 
categories: overall debt can of course be zero when assets are positive, and ‘zero’ is an 
especially likely value for total wealth when borrowing is possible but only at an interest rate 
higher than that paid by assets (see Carroll, 2001). Differences in access and transaction costs 
across liability types can also explain why a household’s debt may be concentrated in a 
specific category. 
b)  Information: Debt ‘zeros’ in a specific category may also be explained by lack of 
awareness that such instruments would in principle be available without cost. Both monetary 
(or convenience) transaction costs, and informational awareness are perhaps even more 
relevant on the liability than on the asset side (on the latter, see Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 
2003). Processing fees can be a substantial fraction of the cost, to supplier and customer, of 
extending small instalment credit. Economies of scale, such as may be afforded through 
repeated credit to an individual consumer (or, in the case of credit bureaus, to many similar 
consumers) can play an important role. And intensive advertising by consumer debt suppliers 
indicates that awareness is perceived by the industry as an important obstacle to debt issuance. 
Moreover, point-of-sale presence is important in extending intermediated consumer credit: in 
earlier times, shopkeepers supplied some of the credit (e.g., ‘store cards’) now processed by  
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banks and other specialized lenders (Calder, 1999) who to this day still cooperate closely with 
retailers. 
ii.  Maturity and liquidity: The timing of credit demand and debt repayment is very flexible 
for e.g. credit card balances. Other types of debt are due at specific times and the loan term is 
a defining contract parameter. Early repayment or refinancing may then be subject to 
substantial fees (see Table 2 for housing mortgages). Instalment loan repayment is due at 
prespecified intervals, which may or may not be a subject of choice by households.  While the 
timing of repayment would be ill-defined and immaterial if borrowing were unconstrained, 
liquidity matters in the presence of realistic constraints. Attanasio (1995) stresses the 
importance of cash outlays for liquidity-constrained consumers, who are prepared to pay 
higher interest rates in exchange for longer loan duration. 
iii.  Interest cost: Rates of return on household liabilities are of course larger than rates of 
returns on household assets. The wedge reflects intermediation costs and/or agency 
considerations (asymmetric information, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Moreover, the interest rate 
is not the same for different debt instruments. Some of this heterogeneity reflects 
administration costs. Some, however, reflects repayment risk: a high risk of non-repayment 
may in fact be an advantage from the debtor’s point of view, in that the ability to default can 
include interesting contingent-asset characteristics in debt instruments. 
iv.  Risk: The nominal constancy of debt does not imply it is riskless for the borrower (on risk 
for the lender: see the point on enforceability below). Two types of risks are typically relevant: 
interest rate risk and inflation risk. Both will to a large extent be determined by the holding 
period or the maturity of the debt contract. The reaction of households for a given specific risk 
of a liability depends on preferences (risk aversion or prudence) and on hedging possibilities, 
(Campbell and Cocco, 2003), but also on the presence of other, uncorrelated background risk 
(Kimball, 1993).  
v.  Enforceability of repayment obligations: Delinquency (defined as temporary and 
possibly partial non-repayment of contractual obligations) is common in credit contracts, 
defaulting on debt (i.e., definite non-repayment or discontinuing debt servicing) is however a 
less common event. Different types of debt carry more or less severe penalties for non-
repayment within a given legal system, conditional on the lender taking action. In some 
countries, but not in others, final termination repayment to all lenders may result in personal 
bankruptcy or debt restructuring plans with partial discharge of outstanding debt. From a 
researcher’s point of view these characteristics are important because personal bankruptcy, 
when legally allowed, can allow a household to buffer negative earnings or life-history shocks 
(Grant and Koeniger, 2004). Also of considerable importance to lenders is the possibility of  
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early repayment, such that no interest accrues (“dormancy risk,” see Carling, Jacobson and 
Roszbach, 2001). Penalty fees are often in place for fixed-term debt contracts. On the supply 
side, of course, the amounts and/or interest rates must be less favourable to consumers when 
bankruptcy is allowed and not too costly. Some personal, mortgage, and instalment loans are 
covered by insurance clauses for contingencies such as serious illness or job loss: such 
insurance, which of course entails payment of a premium, decouples the lender’s and 
borrower’s non-repayment risk, which bears on a third party. Information sharing among 
credit suppliers can effectively discipline borrowers by threat of removed access to future 
credit (see Jappelli and Pagano, 2006). This makes the demand for credit path dependent. 
vi.  Tax treatment: Different asset and liabilities are taxed differently, having implications 
for the portfolio structure of households that are difficult to characterise due to complex 
interactions with economic choices and circumstances (see Poterba (2002a,b) for surveys). 
Here, the taxation of capital gains on assets that appreciate at different rates is particularly 
important—it matters a lot whether such capital gains are taxed as they accrue, when they are 
realised, or possibly not at all. While the same tax system typically applies for all households 
at a given point in time, the determination of after-tax returns on assets through the marginal 
income tax rate of the investor makes the relevant interest rates person- or household-specific. 
An additional consideration is that the consultation of professional tax advisors, who may be 
able to optimise after-tax portfolios given the tax system, is more likely by wealthier investors. 
These aspects apply to both assets and liabilities alike. Tax reforms, in addition, change 
investment incentives substantially over time. This can have tremendous repercussions also 
for the structure of household debt (Engen and Gale, 1996, 1997, Maki 2001). 
What is more, financial instruments are often being designed in response to tax incentives and 
changes thereof. Most noticeably, mortgages as the largest household debt category are 
interweaved with other asset and insurance products such as to yield attractive after-tax returns 
to the average household at low access cost. The implication is, then, that a household is led to 
restructure his entire portfolio by holding such a composite financial product. Box 1 illustrates 
this for the Netherlands. Also see Leece (2000) for the UK. 
4. Categories of household debt 
Unlike income and (to some extent) assets, the most important categorisation of debt pertains to its 
nature (inasmuch as it bears on the characteristics listed above) rather than to the identity of the 
reference person within the household. We attempt a rough classification, indicating potentially 
relevant features worth eliciting from respondents. 
4.1 General and core categories  
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We list here a number of categories that are presumably relevant in most countries, and where most 
coordination and data harmonisation effort—if appropriate—should focus on. They make up the 
largest items in a typical household’s debt portfolio. Other, perhaps less relevant, or very country-
specific items are listed in section 4.2. 
i.  Revolving credit and credit card balances: Revolving credit types have in common that 
they do not specify the actual amount lent to the borrower, but rather set a maximum limit. 
The discretion of using the limit is left to the borrower, which in principle makes monitoring 
of usage necessary and costly, as the outstanding balance is not secured. Checking account 
overdrafts may also be subsumed in this category. Credit cards, as another particular form, 
also provide payment services. This makes it important to distinguish user types, as credit card 
ownership does not tell anything as such on whether the credit facility is actually used. Cards 
usage by convenience users for transaction purposes will for instance not react to changes in 
interest rates, but may well respond to changes in other, non-interest characteristics of the card 
(such as annual fee, length of grace period or other packaged amenities like insurances and 
frequent flyer points), see Brito and Hartley (1995). For revolvers, a (relatively high) interest 
rate is charged on outstanding balances and its variation may well lead to behavioural 
responses from such people (Ausubel, 1999). Maturity is poorly defined (by the minimum 
payment due), and indefinite; additional credit can be obtained easily up to the card’s limit, 
which in turn may be negotiable with the issuer (Gross and Souleles 2002a). For empirical 
usefulness, it is therefore important to not only establish ownership of a credit card but also its 
actual use and purpose. It has proved helpful in existing work to assess in how many months 
of a year the card carried a balance beyond the grace period (after the monthly payment 
made), and what an average balance would be in a typical month. The strong seasonality of 
balances (around shopping periods, e.g. Christmas) requires consistency in data collection 
across time and space. It is also useful to elicit if there is more than one user of a card held by 
a household, or if there are several card holders associated with the same account, as spending 
patterns may be determined by intrahoushold relations between users/card holders (Bertaut 
and Haliassos, 2002). In addition, note that there are particular institutional features that differ 
across countries even for cards belonging to the same international network (say, VISA or 
MasterCard). In many European countries (unlike in the US) it is customary that card issuing 
banks charge the outstanding balance directly and automatically to a linked checking account 
at the end of the grace period, without the consumer having to actively write checks etc.; that 
is, to effectively use the credit facility, one first needs to run the checking account balance to 
zero.   
ii.  Personal loans, not linked to a specific purchase or asset, are widespread. The typical 
idea of such contracts is to lend a specified amount at a specified fixed interest rate with  
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specified maturity and prescribe a precise repayment pattern. This specificity in contracts 
triggers low monitoring costs. Yet, the costs at application are potentially high, as the loan is 
not secured. Therefore, the interest rate charged is often higher than with instalment credit of 
similar size. Also, personal loans are often rationed according to assessment of repayment 
willingness and ability, and have shorter maturity than other forms of credit. The amounts 
involved may however be substantial. Contract parameters, since they are easily defined, may 
as well be solicited from respondents. 
iii.  Instalment credit. Consumer credit is generally cheaper when explicitly tied to the 
purchase of a good or service than in the case of a general personal consumption loan. In case 
of small-ticket items this is not due to the possibility of repossession (which is expensive for 
the lender), but rather because borrowing in order to purchase items with low second-hand 
value is only sensible if the item is actually used. Hence, lenders need not worry about 
borrowers gambling away the loan, and purchase of household appliances may be a better 
indicator of the consumers’ unobservable inclination to repay than purchases of goods that are 
more likely to be correlated with recklessness and non-repayment inclinations (say, fast 
motorcycles or guns). For empirical research, it can be helpful to track the type of good that 
has been bought with the loan. Moreover, “zero” annual percentage rates credit, as widely 
advertised by car dealers and department stores, are only possible when retailers choose to 
bear the financial cost of their customers’ borrowing. Essentially, dealers charge different 
prices to ‘cash’ and ‘credit’ customers, a behaviour that is most readily explained by price 
discrimination incentives (Bertola, Hochguertel, and Koeniger, 2005). 
iv.  Mortgages and other collateralized debt: mortgages are chiefly signed for housing 
purchases or real estate and occasionally for purchase of big-ticket items with non-trivial 
resale value, such as cars (also see: leasing in Section 4.2). Interest rates are low if 
repossession is possible and not too costly; typically, interest rates are flexible or fixed over 
certain time intervals. Length of periods of fixed interest rates is an important institutional 
feature that varies across countries and over time. Likewise, municipal insurance against 
repayment default is sometimes offered; again, this is a country-specific aspect. A mortgage’s 
maturity depends on the item’s useful life, but also varies considerably across countries. 
Mortgages tend to be fully collateralised. Lenders typically impose two types of constraints on 
the loan: first, they will restrict the size according to an assessment of the applicant’s 
repayment capacity (mortgage qualification constraint expressed as a maximum permitted 
loan-to-income ratio), and secondly, they will demand a down payment from the borrower up 
front, such as to commit a stake into the asset. Note that required down payment ratios vary 
considerably across countries. Occasionally, loan-to-value ratios can exceed 100%, such as in 
the UK or the Netherlands, where these exceptionally high loans have been channelled in the  
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past into nondurable consumption or into buying leveraged stock portfolios. Table 3 illustrates 
some of the cross-country heterogeneity.  
v.  Educational loans, alimony payments, and other forms of government spons-
ored/regulated credit. Government guarantees can make it easier to obtain credit inasmuch 
they increase repayment probability from the lender’s point of view. Whether repayment by 
the borrower is more likely depends on institutional details, in particular on whether 
government involvement implies tighter enforcement of debt obligations (e.g. by making it 
possible to seize the debtor’s income) or simply payment by the government as a third party in 
case of default. Note, that government study loans often entail tax or interest advantages by 
design, since they are aimed at attaining certain policy goals (positive externalities of 
education, overcoming borrowing constraints, redistribution etc.). 
4.2 Special and fringe categories 
Here, we report on credit facilities that are more prevalent in some countries than in others, and we 
also list a couple of categories that are not strictly speaking credit (based on formal contractual 
agreements) but that belong into the relevant fringe of a household’s debt portfolio as they constitute 
substitutes to the core instruments listed above.  
i.  Debt guaranteed by wages or non-housing assets: in some countries with highly secure 
employment opportunities, individuals can pledge a fraction of their wages (up to a fifth in 
Italy) towards repayment of a personal loan. Of course, this opportunity is only open to 
workers with secure jobs, such as civil servants. The interest rate charged on the loans is 
relatively low, since lenders can obtain payments from the employer directly. As with 
mortgages, such loans establish linkages between consumer’s activities on both financial and 
labour markets, although it seems unlikely that offering access to such facilities induces labour 
supply or impacts on occupational choice. In some countries, it has become possible to secure 
a loan with financial assets such as shares or with life insurances. Conceptually, these 
arrangements resemble mortgages, except for their lower transactions costs. 
ii.  Informal arrangements (money borrowed from relatives or friends): Such 
possibilities are open for households in any country; their prevalence will depend much on 
access to and pricing in formal lending markets but also on cultural factors. The contract may 
or may not be formally settled. Lending to one’s nearest kin may offer particular advantages 
over bank lending to customers in terms of monitoring and bonding possibilities and discipline 
the borrower (similar to group lending arrangements such as microcredit). This may reduce 
interest and red-lining in the informal market, but carries additional disadvantages with it: 
funds of the lender will often be limited and administration of such loans may be very costly  
  13
to both parties of the transaction. In addition, stigma effects may be particularly large for 
borrowers. It may be noted that money borrowed from family members may not always be 
cleanly separable from intergenerational transfers.  
iii.  Leasing and hire purchase: Technically, a lease is a rental rather than a credit facility. It 
belongs to the relevant fringe as it enables consumption and expenditure syncronisation, and 
hence is conceptually related to the intertemporal smoothing facility afforded by formal credit. 
One might therefore expect it to be a close substitute to a secured credit, such as a car loan. 
Empirically, auto leasing by private households has seen large growth rates in the United 
States in the 1990’s, and substitution patterns with cash purchases and car loans have been 
explored in Mannering, Winston and Starkey (2002). Various forms of leasing exist, and in 
some contracts there is an explicit intent of transferring to ownership at the end of the lease 
against the residual value of the durable (this is sometimes called hire purchase or financial 
lease); in some contracts this feature is an option at the discretion of the lessee (operational 
lease); there are also contracts where the lessee never becomes the owner. One important 
institutional difference with credit contracts is that ownership rights reside with the lessor 
during the time of the lease. Hence, leasing is not always subsumed under credit regulations, 
and formally, no interest is being paid. Issues of payment enforceability arise as in the rental 
market for houses (on this: also see arrears, below), although they are comparable to those of 
collateralised loans. While the analogy with renting of homes is self-evident, similarities of 
economic implications may be limited: Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) document a higher average 
quality of off-lease second-hand cars compared to preowned ones, and model incentives 
provided by the option to buy which is effectively controlled by the option price set by the 
manufacturer. Under specific circumstances, leasing can reduce adverse selection. 
iv.  Arrears, in general, are contractual obligations to pay that are not honoured in a timely 
manner. There does not have to be an underlying credit contract, though. Some authors 
include repayment delinquencies on credit contracts in the definition of arrears. In any case, 
the debtor decides unilaterally not to meet his obligations. Non-credit arrears by households 
are presumably empirically not very important, although there are similarities with trade 
credits (on which: see Petersen and Rajan, 1997) that remain unpaid by the target date of 
payment. One might expect strong correlations with business cycles in both cases. Yet, for 
household arrears occurring on gas, water and electricity bills, effective enforcement 
mechanisms do exist (threat of termination of services). This may be different for arrears on 
housing rents where eviction is a costly process for the landlord (see Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) who document cross-country variability in formalism  
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and efficiency of judicial procedures).
2 Missing regular payments on bills and rents may or 
may not be registered with credit bureaus, depending on countries. 
v.  Other: Any effort of assessing the overall level of indebtedness of a household is 
necessarily incomplete without a definitional “catch-all” residual. There are scores of credit 
arrangements that are theoretically possible and have not been covered in the above (from 
borrowing from loan sharks, and pawn broking on one end of the spectrum to highly 
sophisticated financial products on the other end). In particular in survey questionnaires, much 
of the information provided depends on the interpretation given by the respondent as well as 
his willingness to disclose detail, and a residual category offers the opportunity of filling in 
any gaps. Note, however, that collectors of longitudinal data should be aware of both 
institutional changes and changes in financial technology and in demand. Data structuring 
needs to be able to accommodate such changes, if they become relevant.  
5. Measurement Issues and Data Sources 
The above considerations highlight the desirability of disaggregating household liabilities along 
sensible and research-relevant dimensions, rather than just tracking their total size and subtracting 
them from assets.  
The general point is that to the extent that household assets and liabilities are not traded in organized 
markets, and debt is rationed, their returns and maturities are heterogeneous in complex enough ways 
to make construction of an aggregate debt (or wealth) statistic conceptually difficult. Ideally, since 
debt instruments are heterogeneous in interesting and partly unobserved ways, it would be desirable to 
track them separately, document their institutional and market characteristics, and assess their relative 
price (in utility terms) on the basis of theoretical considerations. Given the various possible 
interactions of the demand for particular debt instruments, partly derived from underlying demand for 
durable and nondurable consumption, one may want to note that observing household liability 
components in isolation is also not sufficient for many purposes, as indivisibilities and binding 
constraints trigger important nonlinear spillover effects on the demand for other asset and debt 
components (see Jones (1993) for mortgage and nonmortgage debt, or Fratantoni (1998) and 
Hochguertel and van Soest (2001) for financial and housing worth). 
A large variety of observable characteristics are relevant to demand and supply of household credit. 
On the supply side, credit availability depends importantly on the supplier’s attempt to assess motives 
and repayment likelihood, which in turn are related to the reasons for credit access. Information on 
occupation and income variability, and on household composition, is highly relevant to both the 
household’s motivation for borrowing and the lenders’ inclination to extend credit. Besides affecting 
                                                 
2 Bridges, Disney, and Henley (2006) includes a detailed analysis of housing arrears in Britain.  
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the overall ‘precautionary’ behaviour of net wealth, income risk may also influence the composition of 
a household’s assets and liabilities: background risk makes it desirable to hold assets whose net future 
cash flows are negatively correlated with uninsurable shocks (Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996), 
Hochguertel (2003)).  
In practice, of course, detailed information is not as readily available as researchers would wish. We 
next consider possible advantages and disadvantages of different data sources in light of the above.  
5.1 Administrative data  
Some researchers have recently gained access to records from credit suppliers (banks) or credit 
bureaus. Such data can offer information as to whether debt is denied and whether it is repaid, and 
they do offer precise information as to the amounts of credit issued, reducing problems of 
measurement error that typically trouble survey data. The data contain in most cases the relevant 
information that the supplier needs in order to approve or reject the application. Customer databases 
contain millions of observations, and even a small random sample will be quite large. As an additional 
advantage, therefore, the cross-sectional size of such data often permits making very accurate 
statistical inference. Generally, such data can also be very precise about actual behaviour of debtors, 
especially when they track credit histories and repayment behaviour. To the extent that such data are 
not only a cross-sectional snapshot, they may also offer extensive possibilities for studying the 
dynamics of credit demand and supply. 
We shall in the following briefly refer to selected work based on such data. Each of these data sets will 
have their own idiosyncrasies, though, and may be more suitable for some purposes than for others. In 
addition, typically the data contain highly confidential information, necessitating exclusive user 
agreements with the authors of the mentioned papers without being available to outsiders. It is, in 
addition, customary to mask the identity of the data supplier. 
Ausubel (1999) for instance, has access to cross-sectional data from a major US credit card issuer. The 
database has been used for market experiments. That is, the credit card issuer wants to figure out how 
people select into using cards when parameters of the contract (such as introductory “teaser” interest 
rates and the length of the teaser period) are varied in a controlled fashion. An address database of 
individuals is screened against information from credit bureau files, resulting in mailing out ‘pre-
approved’ credit cards to creditworthy individuals. Those people that return a signed application form 
will then be screened again on the basis of their actual, self-reported income statements—that is, there 
does exist the possibility of rejecting even ‘pre-approved’ cards. The information available to the 
author therefore contains all the scoring-relevant information that the supplier uses, and simply 
comparing the characteristics between people that do and do not react to the credit card offer will tell 
which of these groups represents on average higher credit risks. Ausubel (1999) finds, entirely as  
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predicted by theory, that those that accept the offer are both ex ante (at the time of initial scoring) and 
ex post (after having used the card for some time) riskier. 
Gross and Souleles (2002a,b) use similar data from several different American issuers that contain 
comparable information. This has the advantage of not having to rely on information from a single 
firm which may not represent the market adequately. The second major difference to Ausubel’s data is 
that their data is a panel with repeated measurements of the same account; that is, they observe 
payment and changes in contract parameters as they are being made. In Gross and Souleles (2002b) 
the authors try to disentangle a demand from a supply effect, on the background of observing 
increasing incidence of credit card delinquency during a period of stable economic growth. There are 
two competing explanations: increased competition in the industry may have caused issuers to accept 
credit risks that they may not have accepted earlier, such that the deterioration in the quality of the 
customer pool has essentially caused an increase in default probabilities (supply or ‘risk effect’), or, 
changes in consumer attitudes (decreasing ‘stigma’ of bankruptcy) may have caused the increase in 
delinquencies, unaffected by supply side reactions (‘demand effect’). Estimating dynamic models of 
credit behaviour, the authors do not find support for the risk effect, and interpret the remaining 
changes as being consistent with the stigma hypothesis. In Gross and Souleles (2002a), the authors use 
the same data and measure credit card spending behaviour (as assessed by usage of the credit line) in 
reaction to changes in the credit card limit. They find an average ‘marginal propensity to consume out 
of liquidity’ of about 10 to 14 percent, which gives support for the notion of liquidity constraints being 
relevant for the pool of credit card holders. This measure is again much larger for people that are 
already close to their limits to begin with. The authors are also able to estimate a parameter of interest 
to monetary policy, the long-run interest rate elasticity of the demand for credit. The preferred 
estimate is –1.3, indicating substantial reaction of card holders to changes in interest rate (Ausubel 
(1991) had documented stickiness of interest rates previously and assumed that card holders would 
hardly react to the rate). 
Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber (2005) study data from the leading Italian supplier of consumer 
credit. That data set is essentially a snapshot, but includes information relevant to a span of several 
years. It is the only one among the mentioned data sets that, while proprietary, can be accessible under 
some conditions to other interested researchers. The ultimate goal of the Alessie, Hochguertel and 
Weber paper is to get an estimate of the interest rate elasticity of demand for credit, and they exploit 
institutional changes and features of the data to tell demand from supply changes. The exogenous 
change is the introduction of a usury law halfway in the sample period, imposing limits on interest 
rates that suppliers can charge. An important institutional feature is that these limits change over time 
and differ by amount and by type of credit (revolving v instalment). The authors argue that the usury 
law has had differential impacts across types of credit on the supply side, whereas a uniform impact on 
demand (if any) can be expected. Essentially, calculating the difference over time of the difference  
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across credit types of interest rates charged will then identify the relation between interest rate levels 
and demand for consumer credit, and hence the interest rate elasticity of demand. 
The key finding is that credit demand is interest rate elastic, with values close to those found by Gross 
and Souleles. This behavioural response may explain why the consumer credit industry has been 
traditionally reluctant to give its interest rates adequate publicity. A higher demand elasticity (at the 
median) in the affluent North (where there is more competition in the credit card market) than in 
Central or Southern Italy is also reported.
3 
5.2 Survey data 
While the use of administrative data offers unique possibilities of studying some core economic 
phenomena with much statistical precision, they miss a part of the picture. First, the data sets do not 
offer but a handful of characteristics about the applicant and his or her personal circumstances 
(scoring-relevant characteristics from application forms). Second, there is no control about people that 
do not apply (either because they do not have a demand for the particular products, or they apply at 
different lenders, or they are discouraged from doing so), and in some cases, information on rejected 
applications is not available. To some limited extent, the data can be compared to characteristics of 
generally representative survey data, to assess, and possibly correct for changes in composition of the 
customer pool over time (see Gross and Souleles, 2002a, and Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber, 2005). 
The third aspect that existing administrative data are missing is the complete balance sheet of 
individuals, and thus a reliable measure of (household) net worth. If anything, credit scoring databases 
may contain the level of outstanding debt held elsewhere, whereas assets remain unobserved. 
Whether collected for research or official statistical purposes, survey data offer a variety of additional, 
very interesting covariates. Examples of data sets in widespread use are the US Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF)—a triennial repeated cross section, the Italian Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW)—a biennial repeated cross section with a limited panel component, and the Dutch 
DNB Household Survey (DHS)—a panel data set at annual frequency. Next to these exist three annual 
panel data sets that focus on incomes and labour supply rather than on wealth, with occasional 
interspersed cross sections containing asset and liability information: the US Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the British Household Panel 
Study (BHPS). Occasionally, also use is made of consumption diary data that are available as short 
rotating panels or series of cross sections but that are often not very informative on the household asset 
                                                 
3 Many other administrative data have been used. For instance, Carling, Jacobson and Roszbach (2001) use 
administrative data from about 5,000 revolving credit accounts at a Swedish retailer. Accounts are followed 
through time, conditional on having been approved. The paper deals with the bank’s risk of dormancy, i.e. 
consumers repaying before interest accrues. The authors estimate, using duration models of credit use, that this 
risk is financially more important for banks than default risks. Roszbach (2004) uses a larger sample of the same 
data (including rejected applicants) and studies credit supply issues.  
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and debt portfolio (US Consumer Expenditure Survey, CEX, or the British Family Expenditure 
Survey, FES). Most empirical work has been conducted on the US SCF and PSID, though. See Crook 
(2005) for more details and references. 
In all these data, personal characteristics that matter for demand and availability of credit are polled. 
They can have indicators of reasons why households do or do not borrow. In particular, as in SHIW, 
SCF or DHS, respondents have been asked whether they have been denied credit, and whether they 
think they could obtain credit if they applied (thereby identifying discouraged borrowers; Jappelli 
1990). Survey questions can also elicit subjective information: inclinations to borrow, reasons for 
borrowing, and relevant preference parameters (such as risk aversion or time preference) or 
expectations. 
Appropriately structured surveys can offer powerful information to empirical researchers. In 
combination with consumption data, such as the relatively detailed measures of durable and 
nondurable consumption in the SHIW, subjective assessment of future expected income and income 
variability can be used as instruments to estimate utility curvature under the hypothesis that an 
unconstrained Euler equation governs conditional expectations of nondurable consumption growth—a 
hypothesis whose realism can in turn be checked using denied-credit indicators (see Bertola, Guiso 
and Pistaferri, 2005). 
A weakness of survey data, however, may be precise measurement of amounts borrowed. It is 
conceptually difficult to define the current value of one’s future repayment liabilities. In the case of 
mortgages, especially fixed-rate mortgages with or without early repayment options, calculations are 
complex and may entail judgement calls. Even in the case of instalment purchase plans the buyer’s 
repayment obligations need not coincide with the purchased item’s sticker price (Bertola, Hochguertel, 
Koeniger, 2005). These considerations suggest that qualitative indicators (or qualitative statistical 
procedures) may be better than attempting precise measurement of household debt amounts for 
different categories. However, it should be noted that similar considerations are applicable to the 
second-hand resale value of household durable assets, and that available information on such aspects 
in SHIW appears to be reliable enough as to yield theoretically meaningful statistical results (see 
Bertola, Guiso, Pistaferri, 2005). 
Caveats on measurement issues notwithstanding, the last two decades have seen an explosion of 
research on household asset portfolios (see the volume by Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2002) for 
references) and selected issues on debt holding (see the volume by Bertola, Disney and Grant (2006) 
for surveys of the literature) based on survey data. We shall refrain from summarising this work here, 
but mention a couple of interesting credit areas that have generated fruitful results.  
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Mortgages constitute the most well-researched subfield. The economic effects of mortgages are 
intricate, and empirical modelling has tried to tease out some of them. Much results from the 
development of the value of the underlying asset and hence on future price expectations. Increasing 
house prices can trigger a variety of responses, in particular from young owners or prospective future 
homeowners, depending on the design of institutional constraints (loan-to-income ratio and down 
payment requirements). Expected house price appreciations would typically raise down payment 
amounts and require greater saving efforts from renters that want to shift into ownership. Some of 
them will save more, others may adjust size or quality of the desired house, and others will give up 
(Engelhardt (1994) using Canadian data and Sheiner (1995) using the PSID; Engelhardt (1996) uses 
changes in food consumption in the PSID to test for liquidity constraints conditional on homeowner 
status). Others again will, when the qualification constraint becomes binding and mortgages need to be 
renewed (or, in the face of increasing interest payments) readjust their labour supply. Fortin (1995) 
found that Canadian women, whose husband is working full-time, are induced to work to service 
increasing mortgage payments after a new house has been bought.  
Some papers look at holding patterns of credit card debt, giving rise to puzzling observations on 
household financial behaviour. In particular, many US households appear to simultaneously hold 
liquid assets and owe high-interest credit card balances, a behaviour that cannot be easily explained on 
the basis of purely financial considerations (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman 2003; Bertaut and 
Haliassos 2002 and 2006). Analysis of such issues based on existing administrative sources is 
precluded, since the asset side of an individual’s balance sheet is not observed. 
Lastly, the analysis of bankruptcy regulation and its implications for borrowing behaviour have been 
studied widely in the United States, see for instance Domowitz and Sartain (1999). The particular 
feature exploited by a number of papers is the cross-sectional variation in regulation across the 51 
states. Households may shield some of their assets from sale and liquidation when filing for 
bankruptcy, and the extent of these exemption levels vary considerably by state. Fay, Hurst and White 
(2002) using the PSID, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) using the SCF, and Grant (2003) with data 
from the CEX are noteworthy papers in this area. 
5.3 Issues and Implications for Data Design and Collection 
The preceding discussion has shown that household debt should be conceptually broken down into 
various credit instruments, such as to assess the entire debt portfolio. Due to common linkages with 
assets, the asset portfolio should where possible be covered in much depth as well. In addition, since 
the demand for credit and its composition is induced by underlying demand for durable and 
nondurable consumption, and since not only net worth constrains people’s choices but also liquidity 
and short sale constraints, the timing of debt holding follows very complex patterns even in the 
simplest of economic models. Having access to data that in addition are informative on level,  
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development and composition of income and consumption would afford tremendous possibilities for 
economic research on household debt. 
Currently, no such data exist, neither as cross sections, nor as panel data. Since each of the existing 
data has particular advantages compared to others, some researchers have been led to combine data 
sets from different sources using statistical procedures (Jappelli, Pischke and Souleles (1998) is an 
example, combining information from the PSID and the SCF). 
A different issue, though, is that even if efforts were undertaken to sample new data with all the above 
considerations in mind, designing and collecting such data is a tremendous effort, not only on the side 
of the data supplier, but also on the part of the respondent. Surveying respondents on asset and wealth 
holding as such is difficult enough, because people need to be assured and convinced that their 
information will not fall into the hands of third parties with particular interests (say, tax authorities or 
commercial agents) and that their identity cannot be uncovered by anyone having access to the data. 
What is typically done is to remove any but the coarsest geographical information from the data. This 
is unfortunate for all those studies that rely on merging in variation in regional attributes to identify 
certain responses (for instance in the literature on mortgages where local house price information 
would be needed, or in the literature on bankruptcy exploiting regional variation in bankruptcy 
exemption levels). 
A further, and presumably much more important consideration once respondents agree to participate, 
is the sheer amount of information that is requested from individuals during an interview. In particular, 
information on assets and debts, including all kinds of characteristics of particular portfolio 
components, is not readily available to the individual respondent but needs to be ascertained and 
looked up. The amount of information will depend on the structure of the portfolio. Considering that 
richer people have more diversified portfolios, respondents whose marginal value of interview time is 
highest need to answer more numerous and more complex questions. This is obviously a problem for 
data quality. It gets worse if in addition information on incomes and consumption, and possibly all 
kinds of other aspects is polled. 
Probing information on (asset or) debt amounts may fail on another account: people may not recall 
precisely the value of liabilities or may not be willing to be precise. This often results in item 
nonresponse. Amounts can sometimes be successfully recovered to first approximation from follow-up 
questions of bracketed answers wherever respondents fail to be precise. Electronic questionnaires, as 
have been used during the last decade or so, offer additional possibilities of feedback and consistency 
checking during the interview, helping to minimise response errors. Additional aspects are discussed 
in Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999). In addition, since missing values aggregate in sums, non-
response on wealth or debt items makes it necessary to apply imputation procedures in order to  
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measure net worth, a very important control variable. Some data sets, such as the SCF, are distributed 
including full imputation of amounts; other data sets may require higher user effort.
4 
Let us now turn to the question of what can be learned from use of administrative data for international 
comparative collection of survey data. We note two points. First, research of administrative data has 
shown that their particular features enable to address challenging questions. For instance, the sheer 
number of observation helps to pin down effects on low-probability events such as, for instance, 
bankruptcy (compare Gross and Souleles, 2002a, and Fay, Hurst and White, 2002). Hence, a large 
cross-sectional base should be strived for. Also, some of the administrative sources track credit 
histories or allow studying dynamics. Survey data can enable this to some extent if they are designed 
as panel data; however, frequency of observation is an issue (many consumer loans, especially of the 
instalment type, have very short durations). Lastly, measurement error should be minimised already at 
the stage of data collection.  
The second point to note is that administrative data are already being used to a large extent by both 
users and providers of survey data since they contain valuable substitute or complementary 
information. For instance, administrative data are used for the purpose of checking accuracy of 
sampling and survey responses, or certain administrative information is merged into survey databases. 
For credit research, the latter might be quite useful, for instance, for cadastral records on mortgages 
and house values, or possibly to access credit bureau information.
5 For this, unique identification 
numbers such as social security numbers or similar must be available with the data supplier (not 
necessarily revealed to the user). Domowitz and Sartain (1999) have combined administrative and 
survey data for their purposes. Statistical offices in some countries (especially Scandinavia) have 
decided to rely entirely on administrative data sources for labour market research, for instance. 
Notable in the present context is a data collection effort by Statistics Sweden on register-based wealth 
(and liability) micro data (“förmögenhetsstatistik”). Motivating reasons for switching to such data 
include high accuracy of data, large numbers of observation, low cost per record, and absence of 
attrition (except for death and emigration). 
6. Conclusions 
The increasing relevance and changing nature of consumer debt in many different countries makes it 
all the more important to collect and analyse internationally comparable data on household debt and 
on the characteristics of credit facilities. As this paper’s discussion makes clear, this is a complex and 
challenging task, with potentially very large (if risky) returns in terms of research output and 
                                                 
4 Note that the SCF comes with a series of alternative “implicates”, to facilitate multiple imputation techniques. 
Central distribution of such imputed replicates (as opposed to uncoordinated imputation by individual users) 
increases reproducibility of research. 
5 Carling, Jacobson, and Roszbach (2001) have merged information from two administrative sources—from a 
lender on loans and from a credit bureau on scoring-relevant information—for the same individuals.  
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theoretical insights into individual choice and financial market mechanisms. While analysis of micro 
data drawn from dramatically different institutional and market environments can have far-reaching 
implications for macroeconomic and public finance policy, heterogeneous responses to environmental 
conditions are key to understanding the underlying mechanisms. 
We have outlined conceptual economic issues and discussed aspects of measurement around 
household debt holding for such a data collection effort. Many complex issues are relevant to the 
interaction of demand for and supply of various credit instruments with each other, with asset 
holdings, with income and consumption, and in particular with institutional constraints imposed by the 
actual workings of financial markets and the tax system. While this paper cannot discuss these issues 
in detail, household debt should clearly not be measured in isolation: economic research can use debt 
information sensibly only in conjunction with information about assets, incomes, and consumption. 
Ideally, researchers would like to have a complete picture of the household debt portfolio, along with 
an extended description and measurement of the relevant characteristics of various debt instruments 
that are actually held by consumers.  
Sufficient flexibility needs to be maintained, though, to account for country-specific idiosyncrasies of 
institutional settings. In particular, the incentives for asset and debt allocation within household 
portfolios are strongly shaped by, for instance, the differing tax codes of various countries, giving rise 
to quite different designs of credit instruments across countries. This becomes obvious by referring to 
mortgages and the tax treatment of mortgage interest payments. Relatedly, some of the most 
interesting empirical research done in the area to date actually results from being able to identify 
particular constraints and mechanisms relevant for household credit behaviour that would apply in one 
institutional setting, but not in others. Thus, in order for international comparability of data to be 
useful, relevant idiosyncrasies of particular institutional settings should be preserved and appropriately 
documented, with comprehensive definitions and descriptions of credit instruments in relation to 
institutional constraints, to guide the empirical researcher. 
In addition, we can conclude from experiences made with administrative and survey data that data 
collection faces important trade-offs when trying to provide comprehensive coverage of credit 
instrument details. These trade-offs are induced mainly by privacy considerations, not only in a legal 
sense, but more importantly by the reaction of the surveyed individuals to the design of interviews and 
to publication of research based on their information. Administrative data are typically not collected 
for the purpose of economic research and the public (or a bank’s clientele) might object because of 
matter of principle. Such potential conflicts of interest between researchers and both data providers 
and individuals need to be resolved by safeguarding non-identifiability of individuals and assurance 
that information not be passed on to third parties and cross-linked with other data. Survey data are 
susceptible to complete or item-specific nonresponse, and to panel attrition. Both are more likely when  
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more detailed questions are put to respondents. One general lesson that has been learned in developing 
survey instruments is that ownership or holding questions should be separated from information on 
amounts and from information on further contract characteristics. Yet, it remains important not to 
burden respondents with too many questions, since item-nonresponses aggregate to missing values in 
calculated sums. It will then be difficult to assess the overall level of debt holding of a particular 
household.  
Returning to economic issues, and stating the obvious, debt holding is an intrinsically intertemporal 
phenomenon. It is therefore important, conceptually, to have access to panel data on household credit. 
They enable to study evolution of debt over time, without having to rely on identification of model 
parameters from cross-sectional variation. The latter is fraught with problems since not only dynamics 
will have to be ignored, but also selection effects arising out of heterogeneity in the population remain 
statistically indistinguishable from path-dependent behavioural responses. In addition, panel data can 
offer, if under restrictive assumptions, some hope for disentangling age patterns from cohort effects. 
Unfortunately, only very few such data sets exist to date. 
In sum, documenting a large variety of aspects of household behaviour, and a similarly large variety of 
‘environmental’ or institutional features, can allow researchers to estimate subtle effects and obtain 
valuable insights into welfare determination and policy choices. Within each country, policy variation 
can be used to obtain insights of hopefully general relevance about human objectives and interactions. 
The much larger variability of circumstances across countries can potentially, if appropriately 
documented and with suitable controls for other heterogeneity, yield much stronger insights and carry 
implications that can be generalised more easily.  
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BOX 1: Mortgage instruments and tax incentives: Examples from the Netherlands 
In this box, we provide a few of examples of types of mortgages that exist and existed in the Netherlands, having 
implications for not only the household debt portfolio but also for asset holding, and consumption possibilities. 
Similar arrangements exist in other countries, but the Netherlands (along with the UK) do offer one of the broadest 
choices of products. Since their design is strongly induced by the tax system, the exact product specifications will 
differ across countries. In the Netherlands, a major income tax reform in 2001 has changed many of the incentives, 
as consumer credit interest is not tax-deductible anymore, and tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments from 
the income tax base has been limited to the principal residence. In 2004 and 2005, further loopholes have been 
fixed. 
In terms of classification, two main groups of mortgages can be distinguished: those where a portion of each 
instalment repays the principal (repayment mortgages), and those where that is not the case (non-repayment 
mortgages). The first group can be subdivided in annuity and linear mortgages, the second into those where 
repayment is deferred until the end of the contract (endowment mortgage) and those where repayment is 
indeterminate. The latter can be subdivided into several subclasses (among which a ‘credit mortgage’ or home 
equity lines and an ‘life insurance/annuity mortgage’) while endowment mortgages link assets and insurances to the 
mortgages in order to deal with repaying the principal. Subclasses include an ‘investment mortgage’, a ‘shares 
mortgage’, a ‘savings mortgage’ and a ‘life insurance mortgage’). 
I. Repayment Mortgages: Annuity and linear repayment mortgage: 
The borrower repays a constant amount (annuity) during the entire loan period, or he repays a fixed part of the loan 
(linear) with decreasing monthly interest payments. Since interest payments are frontloaded, repayment mortgages 
will predominantly reflect interest in the beginning and loan repayment in the end. When interest payments are tax 
deductible, after-tax payments will be much lower in the beginning of the contract than in the end, hence the fiscal 
advantage decreases over time. Such products are attractive for people whose income is expected to fall, or whose 
impatience is high, but their relative attractiveness decreased in pre-reform years as rivalling products became 
available that exploited existing tax incentives to a larger extent. 
II. Non-repayment Mortgages: 
These are interest-only mortgages, that is, the lender only receives interest payments without repayment of the loan. 
Amortisation occurs either by way of a lump-sum payment or by contracting a new mortgage upon expiry of the old 
one. Monthly payments are low since only interest is paid, but total loan amounts are typically capped. There is no 
accumulation of home equity (except for possible capital gains). It is the borrower’s responsibility to save enough 
for the lump-sum payment if the debt is to be redeemed. 
II.A. Shares or investment endowment mortgage: 
The savings vehicle chosen for building up the lump-sum that will be used to repay the debt are stocks or shares 
(possibly other liquid and risky financial instruments). Enticed by capital gains in the stock market during the 
1990’s, lenders were willing to lend large amounts, exceeding 130% of the value of the house. Both the recent bear 
market in 2000-2003 and the 2001 tax reform have made this type of product less popular. Dividends were 
effectively untaxed for many households until 2001. This also has changed since the income tax has been substituted 
with what is essentially a wealth tax (capital income is assumed to accrue at a constant virtual interest rate, and the 
virtual income is taxed at a flat rate). 
II.B. Credit mortgage or home equity line: 
This product specifies a ‘credit limit’ among the contract parameters. The loan contract resembles a revolving credit, 
except that it is collateralised with the house. While interest payments are encouraged, they need not necessarily 
occur. The credit limit can be quite flexibly used to acquire consumption goods other than the housing service flow, 
essentially like nonmortgage consumer credit. Since nonmortgage credit interest used to be tax deductible until 2001 
as well, such constructs were quite attractive and popular. The 2001 tax system regards as relevant the actual use of 
a property as primary residential domicile, limiting the scope for interest deductibility. A flexible interest rate and a 
cap on the credit limit not exceeding the resale value of the house typically characterize this mortgage type.  
II.C. Life insurance/annuity and savings mortgages: 
Here, the mortgage loan is coupled with a life insurance that keeps paying an annuity until the day of death, or 
amortises the debt if the borrower dies before the contract expires. Since the tax system treated life insurances as 
tax-deferred accounts (premium paid not taxable, annuity received taxable), people could make use of tax-
progressivity effects in old age. These fiscal advantages have also been reduced by the 2001 tax reform. Life 
insurance mortgages exist in various forms; the premium paid may be split in two: an insurance part and a savings 
part; the latter is used to build up equity, on which interest is paid tax-free (under certain conditions). Savings 
mortgages, as a special case, link the interest paid on the mortgage to the interest received on the savings made. 
Additional forms exist that allow investing in risky financial assets (breaking the interest-rate link).   
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Table 1: Household wealth and debt (end of period) in percent of disposable income 
country                                     1992    1995    1998     2001       2002 
France       Net wealth                  510.4   507.7   578.0    616.1      605.6 
             Non-financial assets        337.3   312.7   315.8    361.0      380.1 
             Financial assets            253.4   262.9   336.0    336.7      308.4 
             Liabilities                  80.3    67.9    73.8     81.7       81.8 
             Long-term loans              53.0    51.6    52.9     55.6       56.9 
Germany      Net wealth                  530.8   563.1   585.4    568.5      495.3 
             Non-financial assets        341.4   360.6   360.3    340.4      340.3 
             Financial assets            209.9   236.2   266.2    270.9      267.2 
             Liabilities                  85.7   100.6   111.0    112.0      112.1 
             Mortgages                    50.3    61.0    68.5     72.1       73.0 
Italy        Net wealth                  723.8   699.3   713.2    714.2      n.a.  
             Non-financial assets        516.7   475.3   446.9    462.5      n.a.  
             Financial assets            237.7   254.6   296.7    287.0      n.a.  
             Liabilities                  30.6    30.6    30.3     35.3      n.a.  
             Medium and long-term 
loans     14.4    18.6    21.2     26.0      n.a.  
United       Net wealth                  546.6   555.8   666.5    670.9      668.2 
Kingdom     Non-financial assets        312.5   270.2   313.0    364.1      426.6 
             Financial assets            343.5   392.2   461.9    423.7      379.3 
             Liabilities                 109.4   106.6   108.5    116.8      128.9 
             Mortgages                    79.1    78.1    78.6     84.3       92.9 
Canada       Net wealth                  440.6   483.7   505.4    506.3      509.7 
             Non-financial assets        245.6   258.0   265.0    268.7      277.8 
             Financial assets            291.6   329.1   352.4    352.5      347.2 
             Liabilities                  96.7   103.4   112.0    114.9      115.3 
             Mortgages                    64.6    68.8    71.8     69.8       70.3 
United       Net wealth                  482.1   510.7   584.0    552.7      506.1 
States       Non-financial assets        207.0   204.4   205.3    223.6      231.2 
             Financial assets            362.2   400.2   477.2    437.2      387.0 
             Liabilities                  87.2    94.0    98.5    108.1      112.2 
             Mortgages                    62.3    63.7    66.5     74.0       79.1 
 
Source: OECD (2004), Annex Table 58, Selected countries and years. Figures based on National Accounts 
Statistics. Households include non-profit organisations serving households.   
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Table 2: Characteristics of Selected Mortgage Markets in Europe 
Country   Denmark  France  Germany  Italy Netherlands  Portugal  Spain United 
Kingdom 
Average 
duration 
(term)* 
 30.0  17.0  23.0  14.8  30.0 27.0  20.0  25.0 
Average 
expected 
holding period 
 7.0  9.5  15.7  14.4  7.5  19.1  13.3  6.2 
N. months to 
register* 
 0.1  1.0  0.5  1.2  0.25 1.25  0.3 0.8 
N. months to 
repossess* 
 6  12  12  60 5  18 9  12 
Market share 
of fixed-rate 
mortgages 
 78.6%-
85% 
84.5%-
95% 
99.3%-
100% 
50.5%-
66% 
80%-93.5% 5%-9%  0.6-6%  17.7%-
36% 
Market share 
% of new 
lending 1999* 
Variable 
rate < 1 
year 
 20%   35%   0%   37%   20%   95%   0%   62% 
 Initially 
fixed 1-
5 years 
 0%   5%   20%   26%   6%   5%   93%   30% 
 Initially 
fixed 5-
10 years 
 0%   0%   70%   0%   14%   0%   1%   7% 
 Initially 
fixed 
10+ 
years 
 0%   0%   10%   0%   58%   0%   0%   1% 
 Fixed  to 
term 
 80%   35%   0%   37%   2%   0%   6%   0% 
Restrictions & 
fees on 
prepayment / 
early 
repayment 
 Most  fixed 
rate 
products 
prepayable 
without 
fee 
Fees 
only on 
fixed 
rate 
products, 
capped 
at min(6 
month 
interest, 
3% 
capital 
repaid) 
No fee on 
ajdustable 
rate 
products 
Legal 
regulation; 
in 
practice: 
1-2% of 
capital 
repaid 
National 
code of 
conduct: 
10% 
prepayable 
without fee 
(in practice: 
15%) 
Ususally, 
2% fee of 
capital on 
repayments 
of over 
25% of the 
exposure 
Prepayment 
fee capped 
at 1% on 
variable 
rate 
products, 
4% on 
fixed rate 
products 
Early 
repayment 
fees on 
many 
fixed rate 
and 
discounted 
products 
 
Source: Low, Sebag-Montefiore, and Dübel (2003), various tables and figures; rows marked (*) are approximate 
because data in source are presented in graphs only. 
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Table 3: Mortgage debt and time required and cost of mortgage enforcement procedures 
 
Country  Residential mortgage 
debt/GDP (%) 
Loan-to value ratio  Time 
required for 
execution 
of 
foreclosure  
Administrative 
cost (%) 
  1992 2002  typical  Maximum   
Austria  n.a. n.a.  60  80  6  n.a. 
Belgium  19.9  27.9  83    100  18  18.7 
Denmark  63.9  74.3  80     80  6  n.a. 
Finland  37.2  31.8  75     80  2-3  2.5 
France  21.0  22.8  67    100  15-25  7 
Germany  38.7  54.0  67     80  12  4.2 
Italy  6.3  11.4  55     80  60-84  n.a. 
Netherlands  40.0  78.8  90    115  6  3 
 
Norway  47.9  50.2  n.a.    80     
Spain  11.9  32.3  70    100  7-9  17 
Sweden  37.5  40.4  77     80    4-6  5 
United 
Kingdom  55.5  64.3  69    110  8-12  2.6-7 
Canada  42.7  43.1  75     n.a.     
United 
States  45.3  58.0  78     n.a.  8.4  11.7 
 
Source: OECD (2004), Tables IV.3 and IV.5. Administrative cost based on property values of 100,000 Euro.  CFS Working Paper Series: 
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